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A STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises out of an order by the Honorable Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick that dismissed the State's criminal case against 
Mr. Swenson. In his Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, Judge 
Frederick declared that the statute under which Mr. Swenson was 
being prosecuted, Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1) (1989), was 
unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America and Article I, section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. Because Judge Frederick's order 
held a statute to be invalid, the prosecution has a right to 
appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3)(d) (1990). This court has original 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of courts 
of record holding a Utah statute to be unconstitutional under the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(g)(Supp. 1990). 
1 
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN EXCEPTION TO THE DEFINITION OF 
"AGENT" RESTS UPON THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where an appeal raises questions of law 
only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial 
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan 
v. Utah Power & Light Co•, 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases 
cited therein. 
ISSUE II: ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TERMS "ISOLATED 
TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE VAGUE, 
DOES THAT MAKE THE DEFINITION OF "AGENT" UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
IN THE CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT, WHERE THE STATE ALLEGES THAT THE DEFENDANT 
RECEIVED COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where an appeal raises questions of law 
only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial 
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases 
cited therein. 
ISSUE III: ARE THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS," "UNDERWRITER," 
AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where an appeal raises questions of law 
only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial 
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan 
v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases 
cited therein. 
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ISSUE IV: IF THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER," 
AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, IS THE 
STATUTE UNDER WHICH MR. SWENSON WAS CHARGED, WHICH MAKES 
TRANSACTING SECURITIES BUSINESS IN UTAH AS AN UNREGISTERED AGENT 
UNLAWFUL, SUFFICIENTLY WELL DEFINED TO PUT A REASONABLE PERSON ON 
NOTICE, AND THEREFORE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where an appeal raises questions of law 
only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial 
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan 
v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases 
cited therein. 
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THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Constitution of the United States of America 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Statutes of the State of Utah 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-3(1) (1989). 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to conduct business 
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is 
registered under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-13(2) (1989 & Supp. 1990). 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-
dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other 
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or 
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attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in 
this state, and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted 
by Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or 
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 
61-1-14 (2); or 
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, 
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. 
A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or 
issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions, is an aqent only if he 
otherwise comes within this definition. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (excerpts2). 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from 
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected 
through a broker-dealer or not; 
• • • 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an 
underwriter, or among underwriters; 
• • • 
(n) any transactions not involving a public 
offering; 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14.5 (1989). 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, 
criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of 
proving an exemption under section 61-1-14 or an 
exception from a definition under section 61-1-13 is upon 
the person claiming the exemption or exception. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989 & Supp. 1990). 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of 
this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully 
xThe 1990 amendments, effective April 23, 1990, added the 
words "in this state" to the first sentence, inserted the word 
"employees" in subsection (c), and added the final sentence, none 
of which changes are relevant to this case. Compare, 61-1-13(2) 
(1989) with 61-1-13(2) (Supp. 1990). 
2The full text of this very lengthy section is reproduced as 
an exhibit in the Addendum portion of this brief. 
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violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who 
willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement 
made to be false or misleading in any material respect, 
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. No person 
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order 
if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or 
order. No indictment or information may be returned or 
complaint filed under this chapter more than five years 
after the alleged violation. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-27 (1989). 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate 
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it and to co-ordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with 
the related federal regulation. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-29 (1989). 
If any provision of this chapter or its application 
to any person or circumstance is he>ld invalid, the 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications of the chapter which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 
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A STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE, AND THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE COURT BELOW. 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the criminal 
information against the defendant, Arnold J. Swenson. Following a 
preliminary hearing in the Third Judicial Circuit Court,3 Mr. 
Swenson was bound over to the Third Judicial District Court on 
three felony counts of sales of securities by an unregistered 
agent, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 61-1-3(1) (1989) 
(registration of broker-dealer, agent, investment advisor) and 61-
1-21 (1989 and Supp. 1990) (making willful violations of § 61-1-3 
a felony). Mr. Swenson pled "not guilty" to the charges, and a 
trial date was set. 
Shortly before the trial date, Mr. Swenson filed a Motion to 
Dismiss based upon the theory that section 61-1-3(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague, in violation of both the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and 
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
See, Motion to Dismiss, at R. 92-102. Oral argument was held on 
an expedited basis/ Following oral argument, Judge Frederick 
3Several charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing. 
Those charges are not at issue in this case. 
^Because of the short time remaining before trial, oral 
argument was ordered for approximately two working days after the 
State received a copy of the Motion to Dismiss. The State did not 
have sufficient time in which to research, draft, and submit a 
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ruled from the bench that Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague in the cont€*xt of a criminal 
investigation. Counsel for Mr. Swenson prepared for the court the 
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, which Judge Frederick 
adopted and signed. See, Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, 
at R. 146-150 (a copy of which is attached to this brief as Exhibit 
A of the Addendum). This appeal is from Judge Frederick's Findings 
of Fact and Order of Dismissal. 
THE RELEVANT FACTS 
This case did not go to trial. Other than the procedural 
history set forth above, there are no established facts relevant to 
this appeal. Indeed, the State believes that there is probably 
only one area of substantial factual dispute. In the event of a 
trial, the State would put on evidence, in the form of testimony by 
a co-conspirator, that Mr. Swenson received compensation for his 
actions, while Mr. Swenson would rebut that evidence, probably 
through testimony by Mr. Swenson himself. See, Findings of Fact 
and Order of Dismissal, at 2, f 2, R. 147. 
brief in opposition to the motion. 
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A SUMMARY OF THE APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS 
The central question is whether Utah Code Annotated section 
61-1-3(1) (1989) is unconstitutionally vague. That section reads: 
"It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state 
as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under this 
chapter." The State contends, in Point IV, that the statute is not 
void for vagueness, even if, as Mr. Swenson argued and the trial 
court found, three subparts of the exception to the definition of 
an "agent" are held to be vague. Section 51-1-3, by itself, is 
sufficiently clear to put a reasonable person on notice as to what 
behavior is legal and what is illegal. 
The State also contends, most vigorously, in Point III, that 
the three terms in question, "isolated transaction," "underwriter," 
and "public offering" each have well established meanings in the 
area of securities law, and are not vague. 
The issue of who has the burden of proving whether the 
defendant can claim an exception to the definition of "agent" is 
very important to this appeal. In Point I, the State argues that 
the exception is basically an affirmative defense in a criminal 
case, and that once the defendant has provided some evidence that 
the defense may be available, the burden is upon the State to 
disprove the availability of the exception. In Point II, the State 
argues that because the burden is on the State, the defendant 
benefits if some elements of the exception are vague. The 
vagueness of some elements, in essence, makes that part of the 
affirmative defense unassailable by the prosecution. 
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THE APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
It is unlawful for an individual to transact business in Utah as 
a securities agent unless that individual is registered with the 
Utah Division of Securities. 
Arnold J. Swenson was bound over for trial on three counts of 
sales of securities by an unregistered agent. The basic principle 
in this case, that sales of securities by an unregistered agent is 
a violation of Utah's criminal law, is unambiguously set forth in 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 through 
61-1-30 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Section 61-1-3 states emphatically 
that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to transact business in this 
state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under 
this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1) (1989). A willful 
violation of section 61-1-3 is a felony.5 See, Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-21 (1989 & Supp. 1990). If Mr. Swenson willfully transacted 
business, as an agent, in Utah, without b€»ing registered, he is 
guilty of a felony.6 
Violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act are 
undesignated felonies. At the time that Mr, Swenson is alleged to 
have sold securities, the maximum penalty provided by section 61-1-
21 was a prison term of zero to three years, plus a fine of 
$10,000. Effective April 23, 1990, the prison term was increased 
to zero to five years. Compare, 61-1-21 (1989) with 61-1-21 (Supp. 
1990). 
6Without delving into a deep constitutional analysis at this 
point in this brief, the State contends that the language of 
section 61-1-3(1) is, at the least, a crystal clear warning to the 
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The definition of the word "Agent" is comprised of two parts: a 
general definition, and an exception to that definition. In 
order for the exception to apply, three conditions must be met. 
In order to follow the arguments in this brief, an 
understanding of the statutory structure used to define the word 
"Agent" is essential. Section 61-1-13(2) defines "Agent" as 
follows: 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-
dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other 
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in 
this state, and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted 
by Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or 
(j); 
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 
61-1-14 (2); or 
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, 
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. 
A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer 
or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions, is an agent only if he 
otherwise comes within this definition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (1989 & Supp. 1990) (The 1990 
amendments, effective April 23, 1990, added the words "in this 
state" to the first sentence, inserted the word "employees" in 
subsection (c), and added the final sentence; those changes are not 
relevant to this case). That definition of "Agent" consists of 
two parts. The first sentence, "'Agent' means any individual other 
citizenry that transacting business in the area of securities, 
without being licensed, is highly likely to be illegal. A 
reasonable person, so warned, would not engage in such a venture 
without first obtaining a thorough understanding of exactly what 
the law allows and what it prohibits. 
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than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities" 
is the basic definition (hereinafter the "Basic Definition"). The 
remainder of the definition consists of an exception to the Basic 
Definition (hereinafter the "Exception"). Naturally, the Exception 
is only of interest if a person meets the Basic Definition of an 
Agent. 
In order for the Exception to apply to an individual, three 
criteria (hereinafter the three "Criteria") must be met: First, 
the individual must represent an issuer; second, the individual 
must receive "no commission or other remuneration, directly or 
indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or 
sales of securities"; and third, the transaction in question must 
be one of the types of transactions identified in subsections (a), 
(b), or (c). All three of these Criteria must be present; if any 
one is not present, then the Exception to the Basic Definition of 
"Agent" does not exist. The Third Criteria for the Exception 
warrants further analysis because Mr. Swenson's vagueness claim 
rests solely on the assertion that three sub-options of one option 
for establishing the Third Criteria are unconstitutionally vague. 
The Third Criteria may be satisfied by establishing that the 
transaction at issue is any one of the following: 
(a) [a transaction] in securities exempted by 
Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j); 
(b) [a transaction] exempted by Subsection 
61-1-14 (2); or 
(c) [a transaction] with existing employees, 
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. 
Subsection (a) encompasses a number of transactions that involve 
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securities that are themselves exempt from the registration 
requirements of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. See, Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989) (requiring that securities be registered 
before sale); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-15 (1989) (requiring that sales 
literature be filed before distribution); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14 
(1989 and Supp. 1990) (listing exemptions to the registration and 
filing requirements). Subsection (c) encompasses transactions that 
are with the issuer's employees. Neither subsection (a) nor 
subsection (c) are directly at issue in this case. 
Subsection (b) encompasses transactions in securities that 
usually would need to be registered under section 61-1-7, but which 
are eligible for an exemption from registration under section 61-1-
14(2) due to the nature of the transaction involved (hereinafter 
referred to as "Transactional Exemptions"). Section 61-1-14(2) 
lists seventeen Transactional Exemptions, any one of which can 
serve to establish the Third Criteria for the Exception from the 
Basic Definition of "Agent." Swenson argues that three of the 
Transactional Exemptions are potentially relevant to this case, yet 
are so vague that the entire definition of "Agent" must be declared 
unconstitutionally vague for purposes of a criminal prosecution. 
Those three Transactional Exemptions are as follows: 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from 
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected 
through a broker-dealer or not; 
. . . 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an 
underwriter, or among underwriters; 
. . . 
(n) any transactions not involving a public 
offering; 
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(2) (1989). It is the State's position 
that none of the three Transactional Exemptions are vague, but that 
even if one or more of them are vague, that defect would not render 
unconstitutionally vague the entire concept that a person who sells 
securities as an agent in Utah must be registered. 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN EXCEPTION TO THE DEFINITION OF 
-AGENT" RESTS UPON THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE. 
The cornerstone of Mr. Swenson's argument in his Motion to 
Dismiss is his assertion that, under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act, the defendant in a criminal case has the burden of proving 
that the Exception to the Basic Definition of an "Agent" applies. 
That assertion is based upon Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5 
(1989), which declares that M[i]n any proceeding under this 
chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden 
of proving an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or an exception from 
a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the 
exemption or exception." It is largely because of this perceived 
burden that Mr. Swenson argues that the potential vagueness of 
three Transactional Exemptions — which are, after all, only three 
of a myriad of options for satisfying the Third Criterion for 
establishing the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent" — 
renders the entire statutory scheme concerning unregistered agents 
unconstitutional. 
Judge Frederick relied even more heavily on section 61-1-14.5 
in his Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal. Finding of Fact 
number 5 is explicit: "Under the provisions of Section 61-1-14.5, 
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U.C.A., the burden of proving the availability of an exemption from 
the registration requirement under Section 61-1-13 is upon the 
claimant, in this case the defendant." Likewise, Judge Frederick 
stated in Finding of Fact number 9 that "the Court finds that the 
failure of the legislature to have provided definitions of the 
terms "isolated transactions", "underwriter", and "public offering" 
renders it impossible for Defendant Swenson to sustain his burden 
of establishing that he was not acting as an "agent" when he 
effected the securities transactions at issue in this case . . . " 
The problem with Mr. Swenson's reasoning, and with Findings of 
Fact numbers 5 and 9, is that under Utah law, despite the language 
of section 61-1-14.5, the burden of disproving the existence of an 
Exception to the Basic Definition of an "Agent," and the burden of 
disproving (if necessary) the existence of a Transactional 
Exemption, falls squarely upon the State in a criminal case. 
Obviously, a key element of the crime of sales of securities by an 
unregistered agent is proof that the defendant is an "Agent" as 
that term is defined in section 61-1-13(2). Because "[a] 
fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the State must 
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt," State v. 
Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), it is the State's burden to prove 
that Mr. Swenson is an "Agent." The State cannot meet that burden 
in this case without disproving the existence of the Exception to 
the Basic Definition of "Agent." 
Section 61-1-14.5 merely defines the issue of proving the 
Exception as being, in essence, an affirmative defense. In a civil 
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context, a statute may place the burden of proving a fact upon the 
defendant. In a criminal context, however, the Utah courts have 
recognized on numerous occasions that the legislature may not put 
the burden of proof upon the defendant. "Unlike some other 
jurisdictions, Utah imposes on the prosecution the burden to 
disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt once the defendant has produced some evidence of the 
defense." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 988 (1982). Thus, the burden of disproving the existence 
of the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent" rests squarely 
on the State.7 
The recent case of State v. Tebbs, 786 P. 2d 775 (Utah App. 
1990) is illustrative of the foregoing principle. In that case the 
defendant argued that the communications fraud statute, Utah Code 
Annotated section 76-10-1801 (1989), denied the defendant's right 
to due process under both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
because it provided that f'[i]t is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution under this section that the [untrue statements] were 
not made . . . knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth." On its face, the statute reverses the traditional burden 
of proof and requires that the defendant disprove the existence of 
a culpable mental state. The Court of Appeals ignored the language 
of the statute, however, calling it merely "a statement of 
7Mr. Swenson sets forth "some evidence of the defense," in the 
arguments contained on pages 7 and 8 of his Motion to Dismiss. 
Those arguments are based upon the State's theory of the case at 
the preliminary hearing with regard to counts against Mr. Swenson 
that were dismissed at the preliminary hearing. 
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conditions under which the defendant cannot be found guilty," and 
reiterated that "Utah has unambiguously adopted the position that 
'a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in presenting 
an affirmative defense'." Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 778-779. 
In light of the large body of Utah case law that categorically 
states that the prosecution has the burden of proving every element 
of a crime, whether the element is designated as an affirmative 
defense or not, section 61-1-14.5 should be read in criminal cases 
as merely requiring that the defendant put forth some evidence of 
entitlement to the Exception, including some evidence of the Third 
Criterion for claiming the Exception.8 At that point, the burden 
of actually disproving the existence of the Exception lies entirely 
with the State. 
The trial court erred when it determined that the burden of 
proof is on Mr. Swenson to establish that he is entitled to the 
benefit of the Exception. Because that erroneous assumption was at 
the heart of the trial court's reasoning in its Findings of Fact 
and Order of Dismissal, that order should be overturned and the 
8The requirement that the defendant provide "some evidence" of 
entitlement to nhe Exception, as per Wood, is not a burdensome 
requirement, and is eminently reasonable in light of the large 
number of possible ways in which the defendant could conceivably 
satisfy the Third Criterion to qualify for the Exception. As 
explained in Tebbs: 
A defendant's burden concerning any affirmative 
defense is quite limited. State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 
688, 691 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "As a practical 
matter, a defendant may have to assume the burden of 
producing some evidence [of the affirmative defense] if 
there is no evidence in the prosecution's case that would 
provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for [an 
affirmative defense claim]." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211, 215 (Utah 1985). 
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case remanded for trial. 
POINT II: ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TERMS "ISOLATED 
TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE VAGUE, THE 
DEFINITION OF "AGENT" IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT, WHERE THE STATE ALLEGES THAT THE DEFENDANT 
RECEIVED COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES. 
Because the State bears the burden of proving the non-existence 
of the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent," a ruling 
that one or more of the terms "isolated transaction," 
"underwriter," and "public offering" are unconstitutionally vague 
would benefit the defendant; the vagueness of the terms would 
make conviction more difficult, rather than less difficult. 
The issue of burden of proof is critical to this case. 
Normally, of course, a vague statute deprives a defendant of due 
process because the defendant cannot grasp a firm definition in 
order to establish that he falls outside the proscribed conduct. 
Where the vagueness goes to an element of an affirmative defense 
that the State must disprove, however, the defendant may be in an 
enhanced position. If the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the unavailability of the Exception to the Basic Definition 
of "Agent," then any ambiguity as to the nature of the Exception 
would only benefit the defendant. If any Transactional Exemption 
is unconstitutionally vague, that would only make it more likely 
that the State could not meet its burden of proof. 
In order to fully understand this point, it is important to 
recall that there are three Criteria required for the establishment 
of the Exception. All three Criteria must be established, or else 
the Exception does not exist. Therefore, the State may disprove 
the existence of the Exception, and satisfy its burden of proof, by 
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categorically showing that any one of the three Criteria cannot be 
met by the defendant. Assume, arguendo, that one or more of the 
Three Transactional Exemptions, which could be used to satisfy the 
Third Criteria, are held to be vague. It then becomes impossible 
for the State to prove that Mr. Swenson is not entitled to claim 
the vague Transactional Exemption. That, in turn, means that the 
State cannot disprove the existence of the Third Criteria, because 
it is always possible that Mr. Swenson meets the definition of the 
vague Transactional Exemption. The State must, therefore, attack 
one of the first two Criteria in order to establish that the 
Exception does not exist. 
The State is fully prepared to disprove the existence of the 
Exception to the Basic Definition solely on the grounds that Mr. 
Swenson received remuneration, thereby mooting the issue of 
whether the Transactional Exemptions are vague, and eliminating 
the need for jury instructions defining the terms at issue. 
In this case, the State has determined that it will attack the 
availability of the Exception to the Basic Definition of Agent 
solely on the basis of the Second Criterion for establishing that 
Exception. The Second Criterion is that Mr. Swenson, in order to 
be eligible for the Exception, must have "received no commission or 
other remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-13(2). Since the State can meet its burden of 
defeating the Exception by disproving any one of the three Criteria 
that establish the Exception, the State has discretion over which 
Criterion it will attack. The State is willing to proceed to trial 
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based on a jury instruction stating that the* jury can only convict 
if it finds that Mr, Swenson received compensation. The State's 
approach makes jury instructions that define "isolated 
transactions," "underwriter," or "public offering" unnecessary, 
thereby eliminating an essential finding in Judge Frederick's 
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal. 
This approach by the State should have the effect of allowing 
this appeal to be resolved without recourse to an analysis of the 
vagueness of the underlying terms (this court would still have to 
address the question of the proper interpretation of section 61-1-
14.5). The approach is also perfectly fair to Mr. Swenson. 
Whether or not any of the three terms in question is vague, there 
can be no doubt from even a cursory reading of section 61-1-13(2) 
that no person who receives a commission or other remuneration 
could hope to qualify for the Exemption. On that point, at least, 
the statute is entirely unambiguous. Nor does the potential 
vagueness of a portion of the definition of "Agent" hopelessly 
taint the remainder. Utah statutory and case law supports severing 
the unconstitutional portion if at all feasible, which it is in 
this case. 
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-29 provides that if any 
provision of the Utah Uniform Securities Act is held to be invalid, 
"the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications 
of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application." Likewise, Utah case law favors 
severance in vagueness cases. Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
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Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982) ("if a portion 
of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is 
unconstitutional, such should be done."); State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 
2d 66, 426 P.2d 13, 14-15 (1967) ("[t]he void part [of a statute] 
may be disregarded, and the valid part enforced."). In this case, 
if some of the options for establishing the Third Criterion for the 
Exception are void, this court need merely strike the requirement 
that the Third Criterion be met for purposes of establishing the 
existence of the Exception to the General Definition of Agent in a 
criminal prosecution. This means that the State would have one 
less way of attacking the defendant's entitlement to the Exception, 
which can only strengthen the defendant's case. 
POINT III: THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS,M "UNDERWRITER," AND 
"PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. 
A term is not unconstitutionally vague just because it lacks 
absolute exactitude of expression or comvlete precision of 
meaning. 
A brief examination of the vagueness doctrine is in order 
before the specific terms at issue are analyzed. It is hornbook 
law that under the "due process" clauses of both the United States 
Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, and the Utah 
Constitution, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, a criminal law that is too 
vague or indefinite in meaning can be declared to be 
unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court provided an 
excellent analysis of the vagueness doctrine in Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flioside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.. 455 U.S. 489 (1982), 
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which is worthy of a lengthy quotation: 
A law . . . may nevertheless be challenged on its 
face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To 
succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that 
the law is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications. . . . 
The standards for evaluating vagueness were 
enunciated in Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed 2d 222 (1972): 
Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person 
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may 
trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague 
law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory applications (footnotes 
omitted). 
These standards should not, of course, be 
mechanically applied. The degree of vagueness that the 
Constitution tolerates — as well as the relative 
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depends 
in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic 
regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test 
because its subject matter is often more narrow, and 
because businesses, which face economic demands to plan 
behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant 
legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated 
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of 
the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an 
administrative process. 
Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497-498 (footnotes 
omitted). The United States Supreme Court has never required that 
a statute be entirely unambiguous: 
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to 
give notice of the required conduct to one who would 
avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its 
application and the lawyer in defending one charged with 
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its violation. But few words possess the precision of 
mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold 
and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the 
practical necessities of discharging the business of 
government inevitably limit the specificity with which 
legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no 
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be 
demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who 
deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross 
the line. 
Bovce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) 
(holding regulation stating that "[d]rivers of motor vehicles 
transporting any explosive . . .shall avoid, so far as practicable, 
and, where feasible, • . . driving into or through congested 
thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, . . . and 
dangerous crossings" not void for vagueness).9 
Utah law follows the basic approach set forth in Village of 
Hoffman Estates, Gravned, and Bovce Motor Homes, Inc.: 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 
(1952), we recognized that a criminal violation should be 
described with sufficient certainty so that persons of 
ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know 
9The decision in Bovce Motor Lines, Inc. implies that people 
involved in trucking hazardous material would be aware of the long 
history of regulation in that area, a view that was later confirmed 
and expanded upon in United States v. International Minerals & 
Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (in cases where "dangerous 
or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are 
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who 
is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must 
be presumed to be aware of the regulation"). If it is reasonable 
to presume that a person who transports explosives would be aware 
of the myriad regulations governing such conduct, and if it is 
reasonable to require that person to assume the risk for deliberate 
behavior that "goes perilously close to an area of proscribed 
conduct," then it is equally reasonable to presume that Mr. Swenson 
would be aware that securities transactions are a highly regulated 
area, and it is equally reasonable to require that Mr. Swenson take 
the risk associated with blindly engaging in such transactions 
without becoming a registered agent. 
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how to govern themselves in conformity with it. See 
generally Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P. 2d 805 (1974); 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 
33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 
S.Ct 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). At the same time in the 
Packard case, we stated that neither absolute exactitude 
of expression nor complete precision of meaning can be 
expected. 
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981) (upholding as not 
vague a law that criminalized failure to return rental property 
where the defendant's conduct is a "gross deviation" from the terms 
of the rental agreement). 
In short, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague simply 
because it is subject to some uncertainty of application or 
definition. Indeed, under Utah law every effort should be made to 
uphold the constitutionality of the statute. "Legislation should 
not be judicially declared invalid on the ground that it is 
unintelligible or uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient 
as to render it susceptible of no reasonable construction that will 
give it effect, or the court finds itself unable to divine the 
purpose and intent of the legislature." Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 
P.2d 870, 873-874 (Utah 1957). In State ex rel. L. G .A., 641 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1982), this court went even further: "Pursuant to our 
obligation to construe a statute, wherever possible, to avoid 
constitutional infirmities such as vagueness and overbreadth, In re 
Nelda Bover, Utah 636 P.2d 1085 (1981), we are obligated to seek to 
construe a criminal statute to give specific content to terms that 
might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague." State ex rel. L. G. 
A. r 641 P. 2d at 131 (this court then went on to define the term 
"gross lewdness" so as to preserve the constitutionality of the 
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statute that makes lewdness a crime). 
The foregoing principles of lenient statutory construction, 
favoring constitutionality, are particularly valid in the highly 
regulated area of securities law, where people are presumed to be 
aware of the risk of regulation.10 There are no Utah cases 
concerning vagueness in the area of securities law, but cases from 
other states with similar "blue sky" laws1J emphasize the point.12 
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Oklahoma, No. F-88-503, slip op. at ca. 5 
(Okla. Crim. App. March 18, 1991) (holding that statute making it 
10Also, securities laws are particularly well shielded from the 
problems of official abuse often associated with successful 
vagueness challenges. Statutes that prohibit such generalized 
behavior as "loitering" are often held to be vague largely because 
they can be used by police, prosecutors, and judges to persecute 
individuals or groups of individuals. For example, "loitering" 
statutes were often used during the civil rights movement to arrest 
political protestors, or even people who just happened to be 
members of a racial minority. It is hard to fathom how the crime 
of "sale of securities by an unregistered agent" could be used as 
an instrument of such wholesale discrimination. Regardless of how 
the term "Agent" is defined, only persons who transact business in 
securities, without being registered as an agent, could possibly be 
legally arrested. C£. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 (1972) (striking vagrancy laws as unconstitutionally 
vague, largely because of a documented history of police abuse). 
nFor some reason, state laws governing securities are refered 
to as "blue sky" laws. Most state securities laws, including 
Utah's, predate the federal securities laws by ten or twenty years 
the name probably comes from legislative concern that 
speculators and promoters were trying to "sell the blue sky" or 
"paint a blue sky picture" to investors. 
12Case law from states with similar "blue sky" laws is 
particularly relevant in light of Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-
27 (1989), which states that "[t]his chapter may be so construed as 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and 
administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation." To the best of counsel's knowledged, no state or 
federal "blue sky" law has ever been declared unconstitutionally 
vague. 
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illegal to act as an unregistered investment advisor, agent or 
broker-dealer was not unconstitutionally vague: "These statutory 
provisions are clearly stated and understandable by an ordinary 
person in a commercial context.")13; Huett v. State, 672 S.W.2d 533 
(Tex. App. 1984) (securities fraud statute held not vague, noting 
that "greater leeway is allowed when a court considers allegations 
of vagueness and indefiniteness in 'regulatory statutes governing 
business activities'", quoting Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (Papachristou is a case 
holding a vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness); Favor v. State, 
389 So.2d 557, 563 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (unregistered securities 
/ unregistered agent case; statute held not vague: "There is great 
risk of serious financial injury to the investing public in the 
highly specialized field of securities transactions, and all 
sellers of securities are charged with knowledge of and compliance 
with all statutes and regulations governing such sales."); State v. 
Martin, 187 N.W.2d 576, 579 (S.D. 1971) (agent registration 
requirement and anti-fraud provision not vague: "Admittedly it is 
13This case addresses the issue of who bears the burden of 
proof to establish an exemption or exception to the definitions 
contained in the Oklahoma "blue sky" laws. The Oklahoma statute, 
like Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5, purports to place the 
burden to establish affirmative defenses on the defendant. The 
case states that no "blue sky" law has ever been declared 
unconstitutional due to that burden being on the defendant. 
Because "the existence of an exemption is not an element of the 
charge," the burden can be placed upon the defendant under Oklahoma 
law. As discussed under Point I of this brief, Utah law appears to 
be peculiar in that a defendant is never required to prove the 
elements of an affirmative defense, but need merely offer some 
evidence that the defense exists, at which point the State has the 
burden of disproving the defense. 
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broad and comprehensive but the sale of securities is complicated 
and complex.").1A 
With these principles firmly in mind, it is time to address 
the specific question of whether any of the three terms, "isolated 
transaction," "underwriter," or "public offering," can be said to 
be unconstitutionally vague. 
The term "isolated transaction" is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(2)(a) provides a 
Transaction Exemption for "any isolated transaction, whether 
effected through a broker-dealer or not." In a very early "blue 
sky" law case, ironically named State v. Swenson, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court determined that a statute exempting isolated sales 
not "made in the course of repeated and successive sales of 
securities of the same issue" was not void for vagueness. State v. 
Swenson, 215 N.W. 177, 179 (Minn. 1927).15 Since that time, a 
14The Martin case identifies a vagueness challenge to both the 
agent registration statute and the anti-fraud statute, and both 
provisions are quoted in the opinion. The "not vague for voidness" 
holding only explicitly identifies the anti-fraud statute, but 
because the conviction is upheld, ana because the opinion says 
nothing to indicate that the agent registration statute might be 
vague, that statute was apparently upheld sub silentio against the 
vagueness charge. 
15Interestingly, it was the phrase "in the course of repeated 
and successive sales" that was specifically addressed in Swenson. 
Apparently, the "isolated sales" part of the sentence caused little 
concern. The case of Kneeland v. Emerron, 183 N.E. 155 (Mass. 
1932) is similar. There a vagueness attack was made upon a statute 
that exempted "any isolated sale of any security by the owner . . 
not being made in the course of repeated and successive 
transactions of a like character." Id., at 163. The court noted 
that: "It is not contended that there is ambiguity about the words 
'isolated sale.' They do not seem susceptible of misconstruction." 
Id. 
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great many states have examined the issue of whether a particular 
case involved an "isolated transaction," See, Getter v. R.G. 
Dickinson & Co.. 366 F.Supp 559, 578-579 & n.4 (S.D.Iowa 1973) 
(citing to Note, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1635, 1646 n.70 (1965)). It 
appears that no state has ever found the term to be vague, even 
though the exact number of transactions allowed is not defined with 
precision. 
Some general guidelines do emerge from, a review of the cases. 
Half a dozen or more sales in a narrow period of time almost 
uniformly are deemed not to be isolated, while one or two sales 
almost always are treated as isolated. In between, the issue 
becomes one for the jury. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 86 N.W.2d 
901 (1957) (whether sales were "isolated" is a jury question; case 
involved five or six sales). There is only one Utah case on point, 
Johnson v. Crail, 11 Utah 2d 392, 360 P.2d 485 (1961); that case 
affirmed a finding that two sales were an isolated transaction. 
The State submits that a definition of "isolated transaction" 
that treats more than six related sales as being not isolated as a 
matter of law (see, e.g., Sisson v. State, 404 P. 2d 55 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1964) (ten sales not an "isolated transaction"), one sale as 
being isolated as a matter of law, and two to six sales as being 
isolated or not isolated based on the facts of the case (were the 
sales part of the same transaction,16 were they motivated by the 
16In Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 618 (5th Cir. 1974) the 
court held that two sales very closely related in time and 
negotiated together constituted a single transaction. 
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same facts/7 etc. . .) is not unreasonable or vague. 
If this court believes that a more definite standard is 
necessary, however, it could adopt the bright-line test in place in 
several states that "an 'isolated' sale means one standing alone, 
disconnected from any other." Kneeland, 183 N.E. at 163. 
The term "underwriter" is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Utah Code Annotated section 61-l-14(2)(d) provides an 
exemption from registration for "any transaction between the issuer 
or other person on whose behalf the offering is made and an 
underwriter, or among underwriters." Admittedly, the term 
"underwriter" is not defined anywhere in the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. Unlike the term "isolated transaction," the term 
"underwriter" is not an intuitive term that has a commonplace 
meaning outside of the realm of securities law. Section 61-1-27 
provides, however, that the Utah Uniform Securities Act is to be 
construed so as to coordinate its interpretation with the related 
federal regulations. 
The concept of "underwriter" is an important part of the 1933 
Securities Act, and is defined in section 2(11) of that act.18 15 
17Again in Vohs, the Fifth Circuit found that two transactions 
eight months apart, and motivated by different factors, were not 
related and did not serve to defeat the isolated transaction 
exemption. Vohs, 495 F.2d at 618-619. 
18
 (11) The term "underwriter" means any person who has 
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an 
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or 
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such 
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct 
or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term 
shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a 
commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual 
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U.S.C. § 77b(ll). Although that definition is rather lengthy, the 
concept behind it is rather simple.19 As the Tenth Circuit stated, 
in a case that arose in Utah: "An underwriter is one who has 
purchased stock from the issuer with an intent to resell to the 
public." G. Eugene England Foundation v. First Federal 
Corporation, 663 F.2d 988, 989 (10th Cir. 1973). The Eighth 
Circuit recently provided a more detailed, yet still easily 
understandable, definition s 
The statutory definition of "underwriter" is found 
in § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988). "The term 
'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an 
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer 
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in 
this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an 
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled 
by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common 
control with the issuer. 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll). 
19See, Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities 
in Interstate Commerce Report. 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., Rpt. No. 85, 
at 13-14 (1933): 
Paragraph (11) sets forth the important definition 
of "underwriter." The term is defined broadly enough to 
include not only the ordinary underwriter, who for a 
commission promises to see that an issue is disposed of 
at a certain price, but also includes as an underwriter 
the person who purchases an issue outright with the idea 
of then selling that issue to the public. The definition 
of underwriter is also broad enough to include two other 
groups of persons who perform functions, similar in 
character, in the distribution of a large issue. The 
first of these groups may be designated as the 
underwriters of the underwriter, a group who, for a 
commission, agree to take over pro rata the underwriting 
risk assumed by the first underwriter. The second group 
may be termed participants in the underwriting or 
outright purchase, who may or may not be formal parties 
to the underwriting contract, but who are given a certain 
share or interest therein. Id., at 13. 
This statement of congressional intent goes a long way toward 
establishing the boundaries of the concept of "underwriter." 
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in connection with, the distribution of any security." 
The congressional intent in defining "underwriter" was to 
cover all persons who might operate as conduits for the 
transfer of securities to the public. T. Hazen, The Law 
of Securities Regulation § 4.24, at 141 (1985) (quoting 
H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933)). 
Thus, "underwriter" is generally defined in close 
connection with the definition and meaning of 
"distribution." See, Eugene England, 663 F.2d at 989 
("An underwriter is one who has purchased stock from the 
issuer with an intent to resell to the public."); 
Ingenito v. Bermec Corp.. 441 F.Supp 525, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) ("It is apparent that to be an underwriter within 
the meaning of the '33 Act, one must participate, in some 
manner, in the distribution of the securities to the 
public") The term "underwriter" thus focuses on 
"distribution." Given the statutory definition of 
"underwriter," the exemption should be available if: (1) 
the acquisition of the securities was not made "with a 
view to" distribution; or (2) the sale was not made "for 
an issuer in connection with" a distribution. 
20 Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1335-1336 (8th Cir. 1989). 
Under the Ackerberg test, all that a person has to do to insure 
that he or she is an "underwriter" is to become a conduit for the 
transfer of securities to the public, either by acquiring the 
securities with a view toward their public distribution, or by 
selling securities for an issuer in connection with a public 
distribution. People of average intelligence can easily apply the 
Ackerberg test to determine if it will provide a legal exception 
20The language at the end of the Ackerberg quote may appear 
confusing. This is because the exemption to the 1933 Securities 
Act in question exempts people who are not underwriters, issuers, 
or dealers. This is exactly the opposite of the state exemption, 
which applies only to people who are underwriters. Thus, the 
criteria given at the end of the Ackerberg quote, that (1) the 
acquisition was not made with a view to distribution, or (2) the 
sale was not made for an issuer in connection with a distribution, 
are the criteria for being declared not to be an underwriter. If 
an acquisition is made with a view to distribution, or if a sale is 
made for an issue in connection with a distribution, then the 
person who made the acquisition or sale is an underwriter. 
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for their otherwise illegal conduct of selling unregistered 
securities.21 
The term "public offering" is not unconstitutionally vague. 
The so called "private offering exemption" of Utah Code 
Annotated section 61-1-14(2)(n) states that "any transactions not 
involving a public offering" are exempt from the registration 
requirements of section 61-1-7. The key term, "public offering" is 
not subject to a narrowly tailored definition; it expresses a 
policy concept that, because of its nature, must remain somewhat 
fluid. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 
346 U.S. 119 (1953) is the key case defining "public offering": 
Exemption from the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act is the question. The design of the 
statute is to protect investors by promoting full 
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed 
investment decisions. The natural way to interpret the 
private offering exemption is in light of the statutory 
purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which 
"there is no practical need for . . . [the bill's] 
application," the applicability of § 4(1) should turn on 
whether the particular class of persons affected need the 
protection of the Act. An offering to those who are 
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 
"not involving any public offering." 
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 984. Although this definition does 
not specify exactly which offerings will be deemed public and which 
will be deemed private, it does establish a conceptual framework 
for making such an analysis. The idea is to look at the whole 
group of people to whom the offering is being made, and then to 
210f course, as noted above, there is a direct tie-in between 
the 1933 Securities Act and the state "blue sky" laws. In proving 
an exemption from state registration requirements, a person would 
normally be proving that he or she fell under the jurisdiction of 
the 1933 Securities Act. 
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decide whether all of those people are the sort who have no 
practical need for registration• Unless it is clear that all of 
the offerees would not benefit appreciably by registration the 
offering is public. 
By itself, the Ralston Purina Co. definition serves to 
establish a fairly clear division that suffices for many, if not 
most, cases. Fortunately, there are hundreds of other cases, a 
sizable body of regulatory law, and numerous treatises and 
commentaries, all which help define "public offering" in particular 
contexts. While an analysis of those sources is beyond the scope 
of this brief, a quick reference to United States v. Crosby, 294 
F.2d 928 (2nd. Cir. 1961) is in order. That case raised the issue 
of whether the term "public offering" is unconstitutionally vague 
in a criminal prosecution. The Second Circuit held that it was 
not: "While the term "public offering" in the statute alone might 
possibly be open to an attack on grounds of vagueness, the judicial 
gloss placed on this legislation by the Supreme Court in Securities 
and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 1953, 346 U.S. 119, 
73 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1494, two years before the acts here 
charged, cured any defect which might have existed." Crosby, 294 
F.2d at 952. Ever since the Crosby decision, the question of 
whether "public offering" is a vague term has been deemed settled 
in federal law.22 In light of Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-
22Counsel is unaware of any case in another state that decided 
the issue of whether the term "public offering" is vague. It 
appears, therefore, that the matter is settled with regard to 
general "blue sky" law. 
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27 's emphasis on coordinating construction of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act with construction given to federal securities laws, 
the term "public offering" should be deemed not to be vague due to 
the substantial judicial, administrative, and scholarly gloss put 
on the term by Ralston Purina and its progeny. 
To the extent that Mr. Swenson did not understand one or more of 
the three terms in question, he could have requested an 
interpretive opinion, or no-action letter, from the Utah Division 
of Securities. 
One factor that the United States Supreme Court identified in 
Village of Hoffman Estates as being relevant to a vagueness inquiry 
is the availability of "resort to an administrative process" in 
order to clarify the meaning of the law. Village of Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. at 498. Just such an option was open to Mr. 
Swenson, if he had actually read the statutes and found himself 
confused either as to the specific meaning of the terms "isolated 
transaction," "underwriter," or "public offering" or as to whether 
he would be considered to be an "Agent" under Utah Code Annotated 
section 61-1-3. 
The Utah Administrative Code allows for an individual to 
request an interpretive opinion or a no-action letter23 from the 
Utah Division of Securities. Under Utah Administrative Code Rule 
23The phrase "no-action letter" is used in both federal and 
state securities law practice. It refers to a specific type of 
interpretive opinion in which a regulatory body, such as the 
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission or the Utah Division of 
Securities, states that it will take no adverse legal action 
against the party inquiring, with regard to a specific transaction, 
if the facts of the transaction are actually as they were 
represented to be by the party inquiring. 
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R177-25-5 (1990), an interpretive opinion or no-action letter is 
available with regard to any securities matter except the 
application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. Admittedly, the interpretive opinion or no-action 
letter is not binding on the Division of Securities or the Office 
of the Attorney General; even so, they "can be relied upon as 
representing the current views of the Division," Utah Admin. Code 
R177-25-5(2) (1990), and it is very difficult to imagine that a 
person would be prosecuted criminally for following the advice 
given in a no-action letter, providing that the person honestly and 
accurately set forth the facts at issue when requesting the letter. 
If this Court determines that one or more of the challenged terms 
is unconstitutionally vague, this Court should be careful to 
limit its holding to the scope of this case, namely criminal 
prosecutions of unregistered agents under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
The terms at issue in this case, "isolated transaction," 
"underwriter," and "public offering," are used throughout both 
state and federal securities law. This case only raises the issue 
of whether those terms are vague in the narrow context of a 
criminal prosecution under the Utah Uniform Securities Act for the 
crime of transacting business as an unregistered agent. Because of 
the havoc that a finding of vagueness could have upon all aspects 
of the securities laws of this state, the federal government, and 
most other states, it is important to limit the scope of any 
vagueness ruling to the scope of this case. What may be vague for 
a criminal prosecution of an unregistered agent may not be vague 
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for purposes of enforcing a stop and desist order against a company 
that is trading unregistered stock, for example. However, unless 
the scope of any finding of vagueness is carefully limited, all 
efforts to enforce securities registration procedures will be 
called into question. 
POINT IV: EVEN IF THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTION," 
"UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE, THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH MR. SWENSON WAS CHARGED, WHICH 
MAKES TRANSACTING SECURITIES BUSINESS IN UTAH AS AN UNREGISTERED 
AGENT UNLAWFUL, IS SUFFICIENTLY WELL DEFINED TO PUT A REASONABLE 
PERSON ON NOTICE, AND IS THEREFORE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
When all is said and donef the ultimate question on this 
appeal is whether Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1), which 
makes it "unlawful for any person to transact business in this 
state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under 
this chapter," is unconstitutionally vague. That question does not 
turn on whether one, two, or even three of the seventeen available 
Transactional Exemptions are vague. Those Transactional Exemptions 
are, after all, nothing more than one way that the Third Criteria 
for the Exception to the Basic Definition of Agent can be 
established. The constitutionality of section 61-1-3(1) depends on 
whether, in light of the nature of law and the impossibility of 
expressing the complex concepts involved with "absolute 
exactitude," Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183, and in recognition of the 
fact that "one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line," 
Bovce Motor Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. at 340, "persons of ordinary 
intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern 
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themselves in conformity with it-" Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183. 
Persons of ordinary intelligence can easily steer clear of the 
conduct proscribed by section 61-1-3(1). A person can absolutely 
avoid prosecution either by not transacting business in securities 
in Utah, or by becoming a registered agent. That is how the 
overwhelming majority of the citizenry of this state avoids 
prosecution under section 61-1-3(1). 
A person who wants to transact some business in securities in 
Utah, but who does not want to register as an agent, can look to 
the Basic Definition of Agent in Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-
13: Under the Basic Definition of Agent, a person is an agent only 
if that person is not a broker-dealer, and "represents either a 
broker-dealer or an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect 
purchases or sales of securities." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) 
(1989). It is only the relatively small number of people who fit 
the Basic Definition of Agent who need to be concerned with the 
availability of the Exception to that definition. Anybody who 
meets the Basic Definition of Agent, and who intends to transact 
business in securities in Utah, ought to be presumed to be aware of 
the possibility that he or she will be deemed to be an agent. 
Finally, the person who, despite fitting the Basic Definition 
of Agent, insists on transacting business in securities in Utah 
without registering, will still get good guidance, and an 
absolutely black and white test, from reading the first two 
Criteria for establishing the Exception to the Basic Definition. 
If a person does not represent the issuer, or if a person receives 
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any sort of remuneration at all, then the person cannot claim the 
Exception• It is only the very rare person who will ever have to 
face the question of whether the Third Criterion, which may be 
satisfied with a claim that the transaction is one of the 
challenged Exempt Transactions, applies. That rare individual can 
choose from among a wide range of options to satisfy the Third 
Criterion (including the unambiguous option of limiting oneself to 
transactions with existing employees, partners, officers, or 
directors of the issuer, as per section 61-1-13(2)(c)), and that 
rare individual can rely on well developed legal precedents and no-
action letters to give a reasonable assurance of safety from 
prosecution. The person whose only claim to protection from 
prosecution under section 61-1-3(1) is that the Third Criterion for 
establishing the Exception to the General Definition of Agent 
applies, and who has not done everything possible to establish 
entitlement to that thin reed of a defense, can truly be said to be 
"perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct" for which he or 
she must take the risk. 
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THE CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5 should not be declared 
unconstitutional, but it should be interpreted as establishing that 
the Exception to the Basic Definition of Agent is an affirmative 
defense in a criminal case. As with all affirmative defenses in 
criminal cases in Utah, the defendant need merely provide some 
evidence that the defense is potentially applicable; at that point 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to disprove the availability 
of the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The terms "isolated transaction," "underwriter," and "public 
offering" should each be deemed not to be unconstitutionally vague. 
Even if one or more of those terms is deemed to be vague, however, 
the law prohibiting securities transactions by an unregistered 
agent is still sufficiently definite to put a reasonable person on 
notice as to what conduct is prohibited. As such the statute is 
not void for vagueness. 
The State respectfully requests that this court strike Judge 
Frederick's Findings of Fact and Order, and remand the case with 
instructions that the matter should be set for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of June, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID N. SONNENREICH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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THE ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
EXHIBIT B: UTAH CODE ANN. S 61-1-14 (1989 & SUPP. 1990) 
EXHIBIT A: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
N O V . U tsso 
NTY 
JAMES N. BARBER, #0198 
Attorney for Defendant 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8998 
IM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COOTTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ARNOLD J. SWBHSON, 
Defendant. 
PIHHBGS OP PACT AHD 
ORDER OP DISMISSAL 
Case Ho. 901900921 
Judge Frederick 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on r e g u l a r l y for 
hear ing before the Court on the 29th day of August, 1990, a t the 
hour of 1:30 p.m., by s p e c i a l s e t t i n g . The S t a t e of Otah was 
r e p r e s e n t e d by A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y Gene ra l Sandy Mooy; and 
defendant was p e r s o n a l l y p resen t and r ep re sen t ed by h i s counsel 
James N. Barber. 
The Motion and Authori t ies submitted by defendant were 
reviewed and the representa t ions and arguments of the pa r t i e s were 
heard. No memorandum was submit ted by the S t a t e of Utah due to 
the shor t time a v a i l a b l e between the f i l i n g of the defendant ' s 
Motion and the hearing da te . Based upon the information presented 
to the Court, and good cause o therwise appea r ing , the Court does 
herewith make and enter the following -
FINDINGS OP FACT 
1. Defendant stands charged herein with three counts of 
v i o l a t i n g S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) and 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 , Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, tha t i s , s e l l i n g s e c u r i t i e s without being a 
l icensed agent. 
2. Defendant has represented via proffer by his counsel 
that he would t e s t i f y in h i s own b e h a l f on any t r i a l of t h i s cause 
that he received no consideration for arranging the transact ions 
at i s s u e in the counts of the I n f o r m a t i o n with which he remains 
charged. Defendant's counsel a lso proffered that Rodney Goodman 
might t e s t i f y that the defendant did rece ive compensation. 
3. While i t i s true t h a t S e c t i o n 61-1 -3 (1 ) p r o h i b i t s 
the sa le of s e c u r i t i e s by persons who are not registered under the 
Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act, Sect ion 61-1-13 , in defining "agent", 
exc ludes from the meaning of t h a t term as i t i s used in S e c t i o n 
6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) , a person who " r e p r e s e n t s an i s s u e r , who r e c e i v e s no 
commiss ion or other remunerat ion , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , for 
e f f e c t i n g or a t t e m p t i n g to e f f e c t p u r c h a s e s or s a l e s of 
s e c u r i t i e s , and who: . . . [ e f f e c t s t r a n s a c t i o n s exempted by 
subsection 61 -1 -14 (2 ) , U.C.A.) . 
4 . S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 1 4 ( 2 ) e x e m p t s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
transactions from the requirements of Sect ion 61-1-3(1) . 
(a) any i s o l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n , whether 
e f fec ted through a broker-dealer or not; 
(d) any t r a n s a c t i o n between the i s s u e r or 
other person on whose b e h a l f the o f f e r i n g i s made 
and an underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(n) any transact ions not involving a public 
offering. 
5. Under the provis ions of Section 61-1-14.5, O.C.A. 
the burden of proving the a v a i l a b i l i t y of an exemption from the 
r e g i s t r a t i o n requirement under Section 61-1-14, or an exception 
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 i s upon the claimant, in 
this case the defendant. 
6. The Court i s s a t i s f i e d that were t h i s case to be 
t r i ed , the Court would be obliged to instruct the jury as to the 
meaning of the terms "isolated transaction", "underwriter", and 
"public offering". 
7. There are no p r o v i s i o n s in the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (Sections 61-1-1. et seq.) or elsewhere in the Utah 
Code which set forth statutory definitions of any of those terms. 
8. As the terms are not defined by s t a t u t e , the Court 
has reviewed Utah case law in an attempt to find sources from 
which to draw definit ions of those terms to be used in instructing 
a jury as to their meaning. The Court f inds that there are no 
authori tat ive sources s e t t i n g forth d e f i n i t i o n s of the terms 
"isolated transaction", "underwriter", or "public offering" which 
are complete, c l ear , cons i s t ent or avai lable enough to inform a 
reasonable man as to the meaning the l e g i s l a t u r e intended to 
a t tr ibute to those terms as they are used in Section 61-14-2 of 
the Utah Securities Act. 
9. As a result , the Court finds that the failure of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e to have provided de f in i t ions of the terms "isolated 
t r a n s a c t i o n " , "underwriter", and "public o f f e r i n g " renders i t 
i m p o s s i b l e for D e f e n d a n t Swenson to s u s t a i n h i s burden of 
e s tab l i sh ing that he was not acting as an "agent" when he ef fected 
the s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s a t i s s u e in t h i s c a s e ; and by 
employing those terms in Section 61-1-14(2) without the providing 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e , r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s of the terms , the 
l e g i s l a t u r e has fa i l ed to advise a reasonable man of the nature of 
the s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s which may not be e f f e c t e d without 
reg i s t ra t ion as an "agent" under Section 61-1-3(1) with s u f f i c i e n t 
c l a r i t y to meet the s p e c i f i c i t y requirements of due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti tut ion of the United States 
or A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 7 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Utah, in the 
c o n t e x t of c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s for v i o l a t i o n of tha t S e c t i o n 
under Section 61-1-21 , ULC.A. 
10. By t h i s ru l ing , the Court does not express or imply 
any op in ion upon the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of c i v i l enforcement 
act ions which may be i n i t i a t e d by the S e c u r i t i e s Divis ion of the 
Utah Department of Commerce under S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 , U.C.A., or 
Broker-Dealer or Inves tment Adviser under S e c t i o n 6 1 - l - 6 ( l ) ) b ) , 
U.C.A., when and i f s u c h a c t i o n s may be based upon a l l e g e d 
v i o l a t i o n s of S e c t i o n 6 1 - l - 3 ( a ) , 6 1 - 1 - 1 3 ( 1 ) or S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 -
14 (2 ) (a ) , (d) or (n) of the Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act, 
11. As a r e s u l t of the f ind ing s e t for th in paragraph 
nine above, the information herein should be dismissed. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
H a v i n g f o u n d t h e f o r e g o i n g f a c t s , and g o o d c a u s e 
appearing: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e 
I n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n b e , and t h e same i s h e r e b y d i s m i s s e d w i t h 
p r e j u d i c e . ^ 
DATED t h i s j f f i ^ o a y of Q^totrnr, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
DAVID SONNENREICH 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y I m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy o f t h e 
f o r e g o i n g t o David S o n n e n r e i c h , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e , 236 
S ta te Capi to l Bldg. , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114; by d e p o s i t i n g the 
same in the U n i t e d S t a t e s m a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s day 
of October, 1990. 
OOiGC 
EXHIBIT B: 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14 (1989 & Supp. 1990). 
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 
61-1-15: 
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, 
issued or guaranteed by the United States, any 
state, any political subdivision of a state, or any 
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one 
or more of the foregoing, or any certificate of 
deposit for any of the foregoing; 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, 
any Canadian province, any political subdivision of 
any such province, any agency or corporate or other 
instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or 
any other foreign government with which the United 
States currently maintains diplomatic relations, if 
the security is recognized as a valid obligation by 
the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) any security issued by and representing an 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any 
bank organized under the laws of the United States, 
or any bank, savings institution, or trust company 
supervised under the laws of any state; 
(d) any security issued by and representing an 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any 
federal savings and loan association, or any 
building and loan or similar association organized 
under the laws of any state and authorized to do 
business in this state; 
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any 
federal credit union or any credit union, 
industrial loan association, or similar association 
organized and supervised under the laws of this 
state; 
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any 
railroad, other common carrier, public utility, or 
holding company which is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the interstate commerce commission, 
a registered holding company under the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary 
of such a company within the meaning of that act, 
or any security regulated in respect of its rates 
or in its issuance by a governmental authority of 
the United States, any state, Canada, or any 
Canadian province; 
(g) any security listed on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock 
exchange or medium approved by the division, except 
that the director may at any time suspend or revoke 
this exemption for any particular stock exchange, 
medium, security, or securities under Subsection 
61-1-14 (4); any other security of the same issuer 
which is of senior or substantially equal rank to 
any security so listed and approved by the 
director, any security called for by subscription 
rights or warrants so listed or approved, or any 
warrant or right to purchase or subscribe to any of 
the foregoing; 
(h) any security issued by any person organized 
and operated not for private profit but exclusively 
for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable, 
fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory 
purposes, or as a chamber of commerce or trade or 
professional association; and any security issued 
by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 
and any security issued by a corporation to which 
the provisions of such chapter are made applicable 
by compliance with the requirements of Section 
3-1-21; 
(i) any commercial paper which arises out of a 
current transaction or the proceeds of which have 
been or are to be used for current transactions, 
and which evidences an obligation to pay cash 
within nine months of the date of issuance, 
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal, 
guarantee, or guarantee of renewal of the paper 
which is likewise limited; 
(j) any investment contract issued in connection 
with an employees' stock purchase, savings, 
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan; 
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as 
an open-end management investment company or unit 
investment trust under Section 8 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, if: 
(i)(A) the issuer is advised by an 
investment adviser that is a depository 
institution exempt from registration under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or that is 
currently registered as an investment adviser, 
and has been registered, or is affiliated with 
an adviser that has been registered, as an 
investment adviser under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 for at least three years 
next preceding an offer or sale of a security 
claimed to be exempt under this subsection; 
and 
(B) the adviser has acted, or is 
affiliated with an investment adviser 
that has acted as investment adviser to 
one or more registered investment 
companies or unit investment trusts for 
at least three years next preceding an 
offer or sale of a security claimed to be 
exempt under this subsection; or 
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at 
all times throughout the three years before an 
offer or sale of a security claimed to be 
exempt under this subsection sponsored one or 
more registered investment companies or unit 
investment trusts the aggregate total assets 
of which have exceeded $100,000,000; 
(iii) in addition to Subsections (i) or 
(ii), the division has received prior to any 
sale exempted herein: 
(A) a notice of intention to sell which 
has been executed by the issuer which 
sets forth the name and address of the 
issuer and the title of the securities to 
be offered in this state; and 
(B) a filing fee as determined by 
division rule; 
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a 
security of an open-end management investment 
company is to be made more than 12 months 
after the date on which the notice and fee 
under Subsection (iii) is received by the 
director, another notice and payment of the 
applicable fee shall be required. 
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an 
investment adviser is affiliated with another 
investment adviser if it controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with 
the other investment adviser. 
(1) any security as to which the director, by 
rule or order, finds that registration is not 
necessary or appropriate for the protection of 
investors. 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from 
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected 
through a broker-dealer or not; 
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding 
security. 
(i) Such a security must be listed in a 
recognized securities manual such as Moody's 
and Standard & Poor's securities manuals where 
the listing contains the names of the issuer's 
officers and directors, a balance sheet of the 
issuer as of a date within 18 months, and a 
profit and loss statement for either the 
fiscal year preceding that date or the most 
recent year of operations; or 
(ii) the security must have a fixed maturity 
or a fixed interest or dividend provision and 
there has been no default during the current 
fiscal year or within the three preceding 
fiscal years, or during the existence of the 
issuer and any predecessors if less than three 
years, in the payment of principal, interest, 
or dividends on the security. 
(iii) The director may by rule or order 
approve certain manuals as recognized within 
the meaning of this subsection; 
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an 
unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an 
underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence 
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel 
mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for 
the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire 
mortgage, deed of trust, or agreement, together 
with all the bonds or other evidences of 
indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold 
as a unit; 
(f) any transaction by an executor, 
administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee 
in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide 
pledgee without any purpose of evading this 
chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings 
institution, trust company, insurance company, 
investment company as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing 
trust, or other financial institution or 
institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether 
the purchaser is acting for itself or in some 
fiduciary capacity; 
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization 
certificate or subscription if: 
(i) no commission or other remuneration is 
paid or given directly or indirectly for 
soliciting any prospective subscriber; 
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring any 
legal or beneficial interest therein does not 
exceed ten; and 
(iii) there is no general advertising or 
solicitation in connection with the offer or 
sale. 
(j)(i) any transaction pursuant to an offer 
by an issuer of its securities to its existing 
securities holders, if no commission or other 
remuneration, other than a standby commission 
is paid or given directly or indirectly for 
soliciting any security holders in this state, 
if the transaction constitutes: 
(A) the conversion of convertible 
securities; 
(B) the exercise of nontransferable 
rights or warrants; 
(C) the exercise of transferable rights 
or warrants if the rights or warrants are 
exercisable not more than 90 days after 
their issuance; or 
(D) the purchase of securities under a 
preemptive right; and 
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection 
(2)(j)(i) is not available for an offer or 
sale of securities to existing securities 
holders who have acquired their securities 
from the issuer in a transaction in violation 
of Section 61-1-7; 
(k) any offer, but not a sale# of a security for 
which registration statements have been filed under 
both this chapter and the Securities Act of 1933 if 
no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no 
public proceeding or examination looking toward 
such an order is pending; 
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if 
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer 
of the securities distributed; 
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through a registered broker-dealer where the 
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, 
and the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and 
makes reasonably available upon request to any 
person expressing an interest in a proposed 
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer 
information prescribed by the division under its 
rules; 
(n) any transactions not involving a public 
offering; 
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or 
"time period units" as those terms are defined in 
the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or not to be 
sold by installment contract, if the provisions of 
the Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are 
located in another state, the condominium act of 
that state, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices 
Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code are 
complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions 
involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of 
assets, if the consideration for which, in whole or 
in part, is the issuance of securities of a person 
or persons, and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of 
transactions is incident to a vote of the 
securities holders of each person involved or 
by written consent or resolution of some or 
all of the securities holders of each person 
involved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is 
given under a provision in: 
(A) the applicable corporate statute or 
other controlling statute; 
(B) the controlling articles of 
incorporation, trust indenture, deed of 
trust, or partnership agreement; or 
(C) the controlling agreement among 
securities holders; 
(iii)(A) one person involved in the 
transaction is required to file proxy or 
informational materials under Section 14 (a) 
or (c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
or Section 20 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 and has so filed; 
(B) one person involved in the 
transaction is an insurance company which 
is exempt from filing under Section 
12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or 
informational materials with the 
appropriate regulatory agency or official 
of its domiciliary state; or 
(C) all persons involved in the 
transaction are exempt from filing under 
Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the 
division such proxy or informational 
material as the division requires by 
rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is 
filed with the division and distributed to all 
securities holders entitled to vote in the 
transaction or series of transactions at least 
ten business days prior to any necessary vote 
by the securities holders or action on any 
necessary consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or 
revoke the exemption within ten business days 
after filing of the proxy or informational 
materials; 
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell 
securities of an issuer. 
(i) This subsection applies if: 
(A) the transaction is part of an issue 
in which there are not more than 15 
purchasers in this state, other than 
those designated in Subsection (1)(h), 
during any 12 consecutive months; 
(B) no general solicitation or general 
advertising is used in connection with 
the offer to sell or sale of the 
securities; 
(C) no commission or other similar 
compensation is given, directly or 
indirectly, to a person other than a 
broker-dealer or agent licensed under 
this chapter, for soliciting a 
prospective purchaser in this state; and 
(D) the seller reasonably believes that 
all the purchasers in this state are 
purchasing for investment. 
(ii) The director by rule or order as to a 
security or transaction, or a type of security 
or transaction, may withdraw or further 
condition this exemption or waive one or more 
of the conditions in this subsection; and 
(r) any transaction as to which the division, 
by rule or order, finds that registration is not 
necessary or appropriate for the protection of 
investors; 
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or 
application shall pay a filing fee as determined by rule 
or order of the division. 
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director may by means of an 
adjudicative proceeding as conducted in accordance with 
Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act, 
deny or revoke any exemption specified in Subsection 
(l)(g), (l)(h), or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with 
respect to: 
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series 
of transactions; or 
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or 
successor to a person or issuer, or any entity 
subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person 
or issuer generally if he finds that the order is 
in the public interest and that: 
(i) the application for or notice of 
exemption filed with the division is 
incomplete in any material respect or contains 
any statement which was, in the light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false 
or misleading with respect to any material 
fact; 
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any 
rule, order, or condition lawfully imposed 
under this chapter has been willfully violated 
in connection with the offering or exemption 
by: 
(A) the person filing any application 
for or notice of exemption; 
(B) the issuer, any partner, officer, 
or director of the issuer, any person 
occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly 
or indirectly controlling or controlled 
by the issuer, but only if the person 
filing the application for or notice of 
exemption is directly or indirectly 
controlled by or acting for the issuer; 
or 
(C) any underwriter; 
(iii) the security for which the exemption 
is sought is the subject of an administrative 
stop order or similar order, or a permanent or 
temporary injunction or any court of competent 
jurisdiction entered under any other federal 
or state act applicable to the offering or 
exemption; the division may not institute a 
proceeding against an effective exemption 
under this subsection more than one year from 
the date of the order or injunction relied on, 
and it may not enter an order under this 
subsection on the basis of an order or 
injunction entered under any other state act 
unless that order or injunction was based on 
facts that would currently constitute a ground 
for a stop order under this section; 
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of 
business includes or would include activities 
that are illegal where performed; 
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to 
work, or would operate to work a fraud upon 
purchasers; 
(vi) the offering has been or was made with 
unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and 
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other 
compensation, or promoters' profits or 
participation, or unreasonable amounts or 
kinds of options; 
(vii) an exemption is sought for a security 
or transaction which is not eligible for the 
exemption; and 
(viii) the proper filing fee, if any, has 
not been paid. 
(5) No order under Subsection (4) may operate 
retroactively. No person may be considered to have 
violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer 
or sale effected after the entry of an order under this 
subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he did 
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known, of the order. 
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